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We present improved results of twin-field quantum key distribution (TF-QKD) by using the structure
of sending-or-not-sending (SNS) protocol and error rejection through two-way classical communi-
cations. Taking a typical experimental parameter setting, our method here improves the secure
distance by 70 kilometers to more than 100 kilometers in comparison with the prior art results.
Comparative study also shows advantageous in key rates at regime of long distance and large mis-
alignment error rate for our method here. The numerical results show that our method here can
have an advantageous key rates higher than various prior art results by 10 to 20 times. Taking all
finite-key effects into consideration, it breaks the absolute repeater-less key rate bound with only
1011 pulses.
I. INTRODUCTION
Improving the secure key rate and the secure distance
is the central issue of practical quantum key distribu-
tion (QKD) [1–8] . In the recent years, secure QKD
in practice is extensively studied [9–17]. In partic-
ular, the decoy-state method [18–20] can beat the
photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack [9–11] and guar-
antee the security with imperfect single-photon sources.
The method has been applied and studied extensively
[21–42]. Other protocols such as RRDPS protocol [43, 44]
were also proposed to beat PNS attack. The de-
tection loophole is closed by the measurement-device-
independent (MDI)-QKD [45, 46]. In particular, with the
decoy-state MDI-QKD [47–59], we can make the protocol
secure to beat the threats of both the imperfect single-
photon sources and detection loopholes.
However, none of these protocols can exceed the linear
scale of key rate [60, 61], the fundamental limits such as
the TGW bound [60] presented by Takeoka, Guha and
Wilde, or the PLOB bound [61] established by Pirandola,
Laurenza, Ottaviani, and Banchi. The fascinating PLOB
bound also makes the linear capacity of repeater-less key
rate. In this work, we shall use PLOB bound for the
criterion of repeater-less key rate.
Recently, Twin-Field Quantum-Key-Distribution(TF-
QKD) protocol was proposed by Lucamarini et al. [62].
The key rate of this protocol ∼ O(√η), where η is the
channel loss, thus its QKD distance has been greatly im-
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proved. But security loopholes [63, 64] are caused by
the later announcement of the phase information in this
protocol. Then many variants of TF-QKD [64–72] have
been proposed to close those loopholes. To demonstrate
those protocols, a series of experiments [73–75] have been
done. In particular, the sending-or-not-sending (SNS)
protocol of TF-QKD given in Ref. [64] has many ad-
vantages, such as the unconditional security, the robust-
ness to the misalignment errors and so on. So far both
the finite key effect has been fully studied [70, 76], also
this protocol has been experimentally demonstrated in
proof-of-principle in Ref. [73], and realized in real optical
fiber with the finite key effect being taken into considera-
tion [74]. However, the protocol requests a small sending
probability for both Alice and Bob and this limits its key
rate and secure distance. Here we report improved re-
sults for this SNS protocol using error rejection through
randomly pairing and parity check. We present improved
method of SNS protocol based on its structure and the
application of error rejection. Taking the finite key effect
into consideration, we show that the method here can
produce a key rate even higher than the absolute limit of
key rate from repeater-less QKD with whatever detection
efficiency. We also make comparative study of different
protocols numerically. It shows that our method here
presents advantageous results at long distance regime and
large noise regime, asymptotically or non-asymptotically.
In particular, if taking the finite key effect into consid-
eration with only 1011 total pulses, our method here can
still break the absolute limit of repeater-less key rate with
whatever detection efficiency. Taking a typical experi-
mental parameter setting, our method here improves the
secure distance by 70 kilometers to more than 100 kilo-
meters in comparison with the prior art results. Com-
parative study also shows advantageous in key rates at
2regime of long distance and large misalignment error rate
for our method here. The numerical results show that our
method here can have an advantageous key rates higher
than various prior art results by 10 to 20 times.
Before going into details, we first make a short review
of the original SNS protocol, on some definitions and key
rate formula. For conciseness, we shall use the italicized
they or them to represent Alice and Bob. Charlie takes
the role of a quantum relay between Alice and Bob and
he controls the measurement station.
1, Different types of time windows . At each time,
they each commit to a signal window with probability pZ
or a decoy window with probability pX (pX + pZ = 1).
When Alice (Bob) commits to a signal window, with
probability p she (he) decides sending and puts down a
bit value 1 (0); with probability (1 − p) she (he) decides
not-sending and puts down a bit value 0 (1). Also, follow-
ing the decision of sending , she (he) sends out to Charlie
a phase-randomized coherent state |√µZ〉 exp (iθ′m),m =
1, 2, 3 · · · (In this paper, we denote the imaginary unit as
i, and m corresponds to time window), where µZ is the
intensity of a signal state, and θ′m is the phase of the
signal state (Alice and Bob choose their own θ′m inde-
pendently and privately, and the value of θ′m in signal
window will never be disclosed), and the phase can be
different from time to time; following the decision of not-
sending , she (he) sends out a vacuum state, i.e., noth-
ing. When Alice (Bob) commits to a decoy window, she
(he) sends out a decoy pulse in the phase-randomized
coherent state randomly chosen from a few different in-
tensities, |√µk exp (iθm)〉,k = 1, 2, 3 · · · (Note that θm in
decoy window will be publicly disclosed after the finish
of whole communication).
Remark 1.1 The phase-randomized coherent state is
equivalent to a probabilistic mixture of different photon-
number states. When she sends out a phase-randomized
coherent state, it is possible that actually a vacuum or
single-photon state or another photon-number state is
sent out. However, there is no confusion in the definition
of bit value committed: it is the decision on sending or
not-sending that determines the bit value. Once a deci-
sion is made, the bit value is determined no matter what
state is actually sent out.
Remark 1.2 Z-window, Z˜-window, Z˜1-window. A time
window when both of them commit to the signal window
is called a Z-window. Z˜-windows are defined as the sub-
set of Z-windows when one and only one party decides
sending. In SNS protocol, the random phases of the co-
herent state of Z-windows sent out is never announced.
As was mentioned already, the phase-randomized coher-
ent state is equivalent to a classical mixture of differ-
ent photon-number states. The Z˜1-windows are a subset
of Z˜-windows whenever a single-photon state is actually
sent out to Charlie.
Remark 1.3 X-window. The time window is an X-
window when they both commit to a decoy window and
choose the same intensity for the decoy state. In an X-
window, if both of them use the same intensity µk, it is
noted as an Xk-window.
2, Effective events/effective windows. The protocol
requests Charlie to announce his measurement outcome.
In particular, Charlie’s announcement of one and only
one detector clicking determines an effective time win-
dow or an effective event in the time window.
For example, if an effective event happens in a certain
Z˜1-window, the window is called an effective Z˜1-window.
If an effective event happens in a certain X-window, the
window is called an effective X-window.
Remark 2.1 Definition of bit-flip. They will use bit values
of effective Z-windows for final key distillation. In a Z-
window when both of them make the decision of sending,
or both of them make the decision of not-sending, they
have actually committed to different bit values. There-
fore, an effective Z-window creates a bit-flip error when
both of them make the decision of sending, or both make
the decision of not-sending. In particular, the bit-flip
error rate E of the SNS protocol is
E =
nNN + nSS
nt
(1)
and nSS, nNN are numbers of effective Z-windows when
both sides decide sending and both sides decide not-
sending, respectively. Value nt is the total number of
effective Z-windows, and it can be directly observed. Val-
ues of nNN, nSS can be obtained by test on a few effective
Z-windows as samples randomly taken from all effective
Z-windows.
3, Un-tagged bits The bits from effective Z˜1-windows
are regarded as un-tagged bits. (More general case is
given in Appendix.A). As was shown in Ref. [64, 70,
76],we can use the decoy-state analysis to verify faith-
fully n1, the lower bound of the number of un-tagged
bits, and e¯ph1 , the upper bound of the phase-flip error
rate (eph1 ) of un-tagged bits. To make a tight estimation
of e¯ph1 , we need to post select only part of the effective
Xk windows by a certain phase-slice standard [77]. With
these quantities, they can calculate the final key length
by formula
R = n1 − n1H(e¯ph1 )− fntH(E), (2)
where H(x) = −x log2 x−(1−x) log2(1−x) is the binary
Shannon entropy function, f is the error correction co-
efficient which takes the value around 1.1, and nt is the
total number of effective Z-windows as defined earlier.
II. BIT-FLIP ERROR REJECTION
A. Refined structure of bit-flip error rate
As the bit-flip error rates of bits 0 and bits 1 are differ-
ent in our protocol, we can refine the structure of bit-flip
error rate to obtain higher key rate which is useful in the
analysis of bit-flip error rejection, as shown below.
3We label three types of effective events in Z-windows:
1. C events are those events in effective Z˜-windows, and
we use nC for the number of C events; among those C
events, when Alice decides sending and Bob decides not-
sending, Alice (Bob) obtains bits with value of 1 (1), and
we define them as C1 events, and we denote the total
number of those events by nC1 ; among those C events,
when Alice decides not-sending and Bob decides sending,
Alice (Bob) obtains bits with value of 0 (0), we define
them as C0 events, and we denote the total number of
those events by nC0 ; note that nC1 + nC0 = nC ; 2. D
events, both parties decide sending, and the total number
of D events is nD; 3. V events, the remaining effective
events, the total number of V events is nV . Though we
divide the effective events in Z-windows into three sets
here, Alice and Bob cannot tell which set each effective
event is from. They can only know some features about
these sets. Clearly, the bit-flip error rates of bits 0 and
bits 1 are different.
Bob divides his bits in ZB into two groups: group of
bits 0 and group of bits 1. The group of bits 0 contains
N0 = nD + nC0 bits, and its bit-flip error rate is E0 =
nD/N0; the group of bits 1 contains N1 = nV +nC1 bits,
and its bit-flip error rate is E1 = nV /N1. Then we have
the following improved key length formula
Nf = n1 − n1H(e¯ph1 )− f [N0H(E0) +N1H(E1)], (3)
where the definition of n1 and e¯
ph
1 are the same as Eq.(2).
Note that N0, E0, N1 and E1 can be observed directly.
Although the new key-length formula based on refined
data structure of SNS can somehow improve the key rate,
it does not really make a significant improvement unless
we use error rejection through randomly pairing and par-
ity checks with two-way classical communications[78–80]
as shown below.
B. bit-flip error rejection
After Alice (Bob) gets the string ZA (ZB) of length
nt (nt = nC + nD + nV ), they make randomly pairing:
Bob randomly groups his bits two by two and announces
his grouping information to Alice. Alice takes the same
random grouping accordingly. Then they have ⌊nt
2
⌋ bit
pairs. They then compare the parity of pairs. Although
there is no bit-flip error for those un-tagged bits, there are
bit-flip errors of those tagged bits. Bit-flip Error rejection
(BFER): After the parity check, they give up the whole
pair if they find different parity values of two sides and
they keep the first bit and discard the second bit if they
find the same parity values of two sides. The bits kept
from the events of same parity values in the parity check
are named as the survived bits.
Instead of using the averaged bit-flip error rate, we
shall use the refined bit-flip error rate. Before parity
check operation, Bob can classify his bit pairs after ran-
dom pairing. If both bits in a pair are from C events, we
label this pair as a CC-pair, and the total number of this
kind of pairs is nCC . Similarly, if the first bit of a pair is
from α and the second bit of a pair is from β, we label
the pair by αβ, and the number of this kind of pairs are
denoted by nαβ . There are 9 possible different labels, say
CC, V V,DD,CV, V C,CD,DC, V D,DV .
After BFER, Alice and Bob use the survived bits to
form new strings ZˆA and ZˆB. The number of survived
bits is:
n˜t = nCC + nV D + nDV + nV V + nDD, (4)
where nαβ is the number of αβ-pairs (αβ =
CC, V D,DV, V V,DD). Since C events can be further
subdivided into C0 and C1 as described in Sec. II A, CC-
pairs can be further subdivided into C1C1, C1C0, C0C1
and C0C0, the corresponding number of them have rela-
tionship: nCC = nC1C1 + nC1C0 + nC0C1 + nC0C0 .
Bob divides the bits in ZˆB into three classes: bits in
class 1 are originally from odd-parity pairs. Denote nt1
as the number of bits in this class, and E1 as the corre-
sponding bit-flip error rate.
Bits in class 2 are originally from even-parity pairs, and
both bits in a pair are all 0. Denote nt2 as the number
of bits in this class, and E2 as the corresponding bit-flip
error rate. Class 3 contains the remaining bits. Denote
nt3 as the number of bits in this class, and E3 as the
corresponding bit-flip error rate.
As the major consequence of the error rejection[78–
80], the bit-flip error rate is expected to be reduced. To
see how much it is reduced, we can use the following
iteration formula for the expected bit-flip error rate after
parity check. Note that, they will only keep the first bit
if the pair passes the parity check (same parity values
at two sides) and they discard the whole parity pair if it
fails to pass the parity check (different parity values at
two sides). As we can see, before error rejection, the bit
flip error rate is EZ = (nD + nV )/nt. After this error
rejection, the number of bits from each classes and the
corresponding error rates are expected by:
nt1 = nVD + nDV + nC1C0 + nC0C1 , E1 =
nV D + nDV
nt1
,
nt2 = nDD + nC0C0 , E2 =
nDD
nt2
,
nt3 = nV V + nC1C1 , E3 =
nV V
nt3
.
(5)
C. Information leakage, phase-flip error rate, and
secure key rate
Although the parity check above can reduce the bit-
flip error rate, it also makes the information leakage to
the remaining bits. To make a secure final key, we have
to consider this consequence. For this goal, we need con-
sider the new phase-flip error rate of those un-tagged bits
after the error rejection. Prior to the parity check, if both
4bits in a pair are un-tagged bits, then the remaining bit
after bit-flip error rejection process is an un-tagged bit.
Note that, since an un-tagged bit prior to the error re-
jection can be only from an effective Z˜1-window, there is
no bit-flip error and those pairs containing two un-tagged
bits will be for sure to pass the parity check. Using the
tagged model[15, 16], we don’t have to know which re-
maining bits are un-tagged. We only need to know how
many of them are un-tagged. Also, it doesn’t matter
for security if we underestimate the number of un-tagged
bits or overestimate the number of tagged bits. For sim-
plicity, we shall regard a survived bit as an un-tagged bit
by this criterion that prior to the parity check both bits
in the same group are un-tagged bits. We shall regard
all other survived bits as tagged bits. After BFER with
parity check, the number of un-tagged bits in string ZˆB
is
n˜1 =
nt
2
(
n1
nt
)2. (6)
Since there are backward action[78], the phase-flip er-
ror rate for the remaining bits after error rejection
changes[79]. The phase-flip error rate for the bits of type
I in Ref.[79] can be iterated by the standard formula[79]
with the specific setting of bit-flip error rate being 0 here:
e˜ph1 = 2e¯
ph
1 (1− e¯ph1 ). (7)
Actually, we can also directly obtain the iterated formula
above for phase-flip error rate through a virtual protocol
with quantum entanglement. The key length formula
after error rejection is
Nf = n˜1[1−H(e˜ph1 )]−f [nt1H(E1)+nt2H(E2)+nt3H(E3)].
(8)
D. key rate with finite key effects
If we take the finite key effects into consideration, using
the method given in [55, 76],the key length formula after
error rejection can be expressed as
Nf = n1L[1−H(eph1u)]− f [nt1H(E1) + nt2H(E2)
+nt3H(E3)]− log2
2
εcor
− 2 log2
1√
2εPAεˆ
,
(9)
where the definition of nt1, nt2, nt3 and E1, E2, E3 are all
given in Sec.II B. They are all directly observable, though
one can theoretically forcast them by Eq.(5). With
Eq.(9), the protocol is εtot-secure with εtot = εcor + εsec,
where εsec = 2εˆ+ 4ε+ εPA + εn1, and εcor is the failure
probability of error correction. Here εˆ is the coefficient
when using the chain rules for smooth min- and max-
entropies[81], εPA is the failure probability of privacy
amplification, ε is the failure probability for estimation
of the phase-flip error rate of un-tagged bits in string ZˆA
and ZˆB, and εn1 is the failure probability for estimation
of the lower bound of the total number of un-tagged bits
in string ZˆA and ZˆB. In this paper, we set the failure
probability of Chernoff Bond [55, 82] as ξ = 10−10, and
ε = 3ξ,εn1 = 6ξ. And we set εcor = εˆ = εPA = ξ, thus
εtot = 2.2× 10−9.
In Eq.(9), n1L is lower bound of the number of un-
tagged bits after error rejection, and eph1u is upper bound
of phase-flip error rate of un-tagged bits after error re-
jection, explicitly they can be calculated by
n1L =ϕ
L(〈n˜1〉)
e˜ph1u =
ϕU (〈n˜1〉2〈e¯ph1 〉(1 − 〈e¯ph1 〉)
〈n˜1〉 ,
(10)
where
〈n˜1〉 = nt
2
(
〈n1〉
nt
)2, (11)
and the definition of nt is the same as Eq.(2). Here 〈n1〉
is the expected value of the number of un-tagged bits
before error-rejection, and 〈e¯ph1 〉 is the expected value of
the upper bound of phase-flip error rate of un-tagged bits
before error-rejection. 〈n1〉 and 〈e¯ph1 〉 can be calculated
through four intensities decoy state method, as given in
Ref.[70, 76]. And we use Chernoff-bound [55, 82] ϕL(Y )
to calculate the lower bound of value Y , and ϕU (Y ) to
calculate the Upper bound of value Y . In specific
ϕU (Y ) = [1 + δ1(Y )]Y
ϕL(Y ) = [1− δ2(Y )]Y
(12)
where δ1 and δ2 are obtained by solving the following
equations
(
exp δ1
(1 + δ1)1+δ1
)Y =
ξ
2
(
exp δ2
(1− δ2)1−δ2 )
Y =
ξ
2
,
(13)
where ξ is the failure probability of Chernoff-bound.
E. numerical simulation
Here in our simulation, we set the failure probability
for parameters estimation as ξ = 10−10 for finite key
effects in the key-rate calculation of Fig.1 and Fig.2.
As we can see in Fig.1, when the finite key effect is
taken into consideration, our improved method given in
Eq.(9) presents the advantageous result at long distance
regime. It exceeds the absolute limit of repeater-less key
rate (PLOB bound[61] with detector efficiency η = 1),
also the secure distance is 70km longer compared with
Ref.[83]. At shorter distance regime, Ref.[83] produces a
higher key rate. Device parameters used are given in row
A of Table.I
In Fig.2, setting the total number of pulses as 1012,
our improved method given in Eq.(9) breaks the absolute
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FIG. 1: (Color online)Optimized key rates with 1011 pulses by
Eq.(9) (purple solid line) and the method of Ref. [83] (green
dash line). PLOB-1 is repeter-less key rate bound [61] with
detector efficiency η = 1, i.e., the absolute limit of repeater-
less key rate. PLOB-2 is repeter-less key rate bound [61] with
detector efficiency η = 0.3, i.e., the relative limit of repeater-
less key rate. Here, four intensities[70, 76] are used in the
decoy state calculation with Eq.(9). Device parameters are
given by row A of Table I. Finite key effects are taken with
failure probability of ξ = 10−10.
limit of repeater-less key rate more significantly. Eq.(9)
gives the longest secure distance, 50km longer than Origi-
nal SNS protocol[64] and 70km longer than Ref.[83] under
the same parameters given in row B of Table.I.
d η0 f ea N
A 10−8 0.30 1.10 0.03 1011
B 10−8 0.30 1.10 0.03 1012
C 10−8 0.50 1.15 0.05 asymptotic
D 8× 10−8 0.30 1.15 0.05 asymptotic
E 8× 10−8 0.30 1.15 0.10 asymptotic
F 8× 10−8 0.30 1.15 0.15 asymptotic
TABLE I: Device parameters used in numerical simulations.
d: the dark count rate. η0: the detection efficiency of all
detectors. f : the error correction inefficiency. ea: the mis-
alignment error. N : total number of time windows. The fiber
loss is setted as αf = 0.2.
.
In Table.II, the key rates of Eq.(9) and Ref.[84] in
502km are given. We use the parameters of Ref.[84] in
calculation, which are d = 1.26× 10−8, ed = 9.8%, η0 =
0.29, αf = 0.162, ξ = 1.71 × 10−10 and N = 2.0 × 1013.
Table.II shows that the key rate of Eq.(9) is 10 times
higher than that of Ref.[84] in 502km.
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FIG. 2: (Color online)Optimized key rates with 1012 pulses
by Eq.(9) (purple solid line), original SNS protocol[64] with
finite key effects[76](red dots dash line) and the method of
Ref. [83] (green dash line). PLOB-1 is repeter-less key rate
bound [61] with detector efficiency η = 1, i.e., the absolute
limit of repeater-less key rate. Here, four intensities[70, 76]
are used in the decoy state calculation with Eq.(9) and the
original SNS protocol[64]. Device parameters are given by
row B of Table I. Finite key effects are taken with failure
probability of ξ = 10−10.
distance(km) Ref.[84] Eq.(9)
502 1.68 × 10−9 1.86 × 10−8
TABLE II: The key rates of Ref.[84] and Eq.(9) in 502 km.
We use the parameters of Ref.[84] in calculation, e.g., the
dark count rate is d = 1.26 × 10−8, the misalignment-error
probability is ed = 9.8%, the detection efficiency is η0 = 0.29,
the fiber loss is αf = 0.162, the failure probability is ξ =
1.71×10−10 , and the total number of pulses is N = 2.0×1013 .
III. ODD-PARITY ERROR REJECTION AND
AOPP METHOD
distance(km) EZ E1 E2 E3
100 10.28% 2.27 × 10−6 5.00% 9.77 × 10−11
300 10.28% 2.33 × 10−4 4.96% 1.04 × 10−6
500 13.00% 2.03% 3.48% 1.18%
TABLE III: Comparison of the bit-flip error rate
prior(EZ)(defined in Sec.II B) and after bit-flip error
rejection (E1, E2, E3) under typical distances. Device
parameters are given in row C of Table I.
In Table. III, we list the bit-flip error rate before and
after BFER in some typical distances, the device param-
6eters are given in row C of Table I. We can see that, with
the help of bit-flip error rejection and the refined struc-
ture of bit-flip error rate, the bit-flip error rate is reduced
dramatically, hence our method can significantly improve
the performance of the method in Ref. [64].
In the original SNS protocol, we have to use very small
sending probability so as to control the bit-flip error rate.
By using BFER here, we can improve the sending prob-
ability and therefore obtain advantageous result at the
regime of long distances. But, consider Eq.(8), after er-
ror rejection, the bit-flip error rate of survived bits from
even-parity groups can be still quite large. This limits
the key rate. Naturally, more advantageous results can
be obtained if we use odd-parity events only.
A. odd-parity sifting
Note that after post-selection process described above,
the bit-flip error rate is concentrated on those even-parity
pairs, as shown in Table. III. Thus if we only use those
odd-parity pairs to extract the final keys, the final key
rates may be improved. Based on this idea, we continue
the operation of Sec. II, but in the final step, only the
odd-parity pairs are reserved to extract the final keys.
After random pairing, the total number of odd-parity
pairs NR would be
NR =
N1N0
N1 +N0
, (14)
where the definitions of N1 and N0 are the same as
Eq.(3). Note that NR is directly observable.
After the bit-flip error rejection and odd-parity sifting,
Alice and Bob use the remaining bits to form new strings
Zˆ ′A and Zˆ
′
B.
We denote the total number of un-tagged bits in C1
events by n11, and the total number of un-tagged bits in
C0 events by n
0
1, then we have n1 = n
1
1+n
0
1. The number
of un-tagged bits n01, n
1
1 can be estimated exactly in the
asymptotic case.
After the bit-flip error rejection and odd-parity sifting,
the number of un-tagged bits in string Zˆ ′B is
n′1 =
nt
2
[
n11n
0
1
n2t
+
n01n
1
1
n2t
]. (15)
with the non-trivial proof in the Appendix. B, we have
the following iteration formula for the phase-flip error
rate of the survived bits after error rejection taken from
those odd-parity groups only:
e′phodd = 2e¯
ph
1 (1 − e¯ph1 ). (16)
And hence the key rate formula
Nf = n
′
1[1−H(e′phodd)]− fnt1H(E1), (17)
where the definition of nt1 and E1 are the same as Eq.(8),
and they are all directly observable. The phase error rate
iteration formula Eq.(16) happens to be the same with
Eq.(7). However, the proof of this is nontrivial.
Note that, after error rejection, if we only use those sur-
vived bits from odd-parity groups, the original phase-flip
iteration formula Eq.(7) does not have to hold automat-
ically, because it is for the case of using both odd-parity
events and even-parity events, while the phase-flip error
rate for survived bits from odd-parity group can be dif-
ferent from that of even-parity group. Consider the spe-
cific example: Alice and Bob initially share a number of
entangled pairs with each of them being in the identical
state |ψ〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+exp(iφ)|11〉), and σ = |ψ〉〈ψ|,which
is
σ =
1
2
[|00〉〈00|+ exp(iφ)|11〉〈00|
+exp(−iφ)|00〉〈11|+ |11〉〈11|].
(18)
One can easily check that after pairing and parity check,
the phase-flip error rate for survived pairs from odd-
parity groups is 0, while the value from even-parity
groups is 2 sin2 φ. They are different. Therefore, in gen-
eral, we need a separate proof for the iteration formula
of phase-flip error rate of survived bits from odd-parity
groups only. We complete this non-trivial proof in Ap-
pendixB
B. Actively Odd-Parity Pairing
Further, if we actively make odd-parity pairing, say, in
our randomly grouping, we let each group contain a pair
of different bits, we shall obtain more odd-parity pairs
than passively choose odd-parity events after randomly
pairing. First, we define “actively odd-parity pairing”
(AOPP) process: Randomly group the bits from a cer-
tain bit string two by two, with a condition that each
pairs are for sure in odd-parity. That is to say, the ran-
dom grouping here is not entirely random. If one chooses
the first bit for a certain pair entirely randomly from all
available bits, then the second bit can only be chosen ran-
domly from those available bits which have a bit value
different from the first bit. Obviously, they can repeat
the above AOPP procedure until they obtain the largest
possible number of odd-parity bit pairs.
After Bob gets the string ZB, he performs AOPP.
Then the total number of odd-parity pairs he can obtain
through AOPP is
NA = min (N1, N0), (19)
where the definitions of N1, N0 are the same as Eq.(3).
Note that N1, N0, NA can be observed directly. After
parity check, there are two possible different groups, la-
beled with C1C0 + C0C1, V D +DV . The total number
pairs in each group
NC1C0+C0C1 =
nC1
N1
nC0
N0
NA,
NVD+DV =
nV
N1
nD
N0
NA.
(20)
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FIG. 3: (Color online) The optimized asymptotic key tates by
Eq.(25) (the purple solid line) and NPPTF-QKD[68] (green
dash line). PLOB-2 is repeter-less key rate bound [61] with
detector efficiency η = 0.3, i.e., the relative limit of repeater-
less key rate. The method of this work presents advantageous
results in long distance regime. Devices’ parameters are given
by row F of Table I.
They keep the first bit in the pair, and discard the other
bit. Then they use the remaining bits to form new string
Zˆ ′′A and Zˆ
′′
B with length
N˜t = NC1C0+C0C1 +NVD+DV , (21)
and the bit-flip error rate
E′′Z =
NV D+DV
N˜t
. (22)
After AOPP and parity check, the number of un-tagged
bits in string Zˆ ′′B is
n′′1 =
n01
N0
n11
N1
NA. (23)
As proved in Appendix.C, the phase-flip error rate should
be the same as Eq.(16), which is
e′′ph1 = 2e¯
ph
1 (1− e¯ph1 ), (24)
and the definitions of n01 and n
1
1 are the same as Eq.(15),
and the asymptotic key length formula
Nf = n
′′
1[1−H(e′′ph1 )]− fN˜tH(E′′Z). (25)
In the following asymptotic key-rate calculations, we
assume infinite intensities for the decoy-state analysis.
In Fig. 3, we can see that when the misalignment is as
large as 15%, our improved SNS protocol can still break
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FIG. 4: (Color online) The optimized asymptotic key tates by
Eq.(25) (the purple solid line) and NPPTF-QKD[68] (green
dash line). PLOB-1 is repeter-less key rate bound [61] with
detector efficiency η = 1, i.e., the absolute limit of repeater-
less key rate. The method of this work presents advantageous
results in long distance regime. Devices’ parameters are given
by row D of Table I.
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FIG. 5: (Color online) The optimized asymptotic key tates
by Eq.(25) (the purple solid line) and NPPTF-QKD[68](green
dash line). PLOB-1 is repeter-less key rate bound [61] with
detector efficiency η = 1, i.e., the absolute limit of repeater-
less key rate. The method of this work presents advantageous
results in long distance regime. Devices’ parameters are given
by row E of Table I.
8distance(km) 160 240 300
Eq.(25) 2.79× 10−5 3.99 × 10−6 7.01× 10−7
Ref. [68] 1.00× 10−5 1.67 × 10−7 -
TABLE IV: The optimized asymptotic key rates by Eq.(25)
and NPPTF-QKD[68] in some typical distance. Device pa-
rameters are given in row F of Table I.
the relative limit of repeater-less key rate[61], and the
total length of secure distance given by Eq.(25)is 100km
further than that given by Ref.[68]. Besides, from Ta-
ble.IV we can see that the key rates of Eq.(25) is about
20 times higher than that in Ref.[68] in 240km.
In Fig. 4, we can see that when the dark count is as
large as 8 × 10−8, and the detection efficiency is 0.3,
our improved post data processing method, the AOPP
method, Eq.(25) can make SNS protocol break the abso-
lute limit of repeater-less key rate[61], and the key rate
is higher than that of NPPTF-QKD[68] at long distance
regime. Device parameters are given in row D of Table. I.
Our result in this work has even more advantageous
results in the regime of larger misalignment error rate.
This property can be rather useful in situation such as
field test, the free space realization, and so on. In Fig. 5,
we further increase the optical misalignment error to
10%, key rates of AOPP Eq.(25) can still break the ab-
solute limit of repeater-less key rate[61], and the key rate
is higher than that of NPPTF-QKD[68] at large noise
regime. Device parameters are given in row E of Table. I.
IV. CONCLUSION AND DISCUSSION
In this paper, we have improved the performance of the
SNS protocol [64] with the help of the post processing
of bit-flip error rejection with two-way classical commu-
nications method [78–80]. We have considered finite key
effect in Sec.II, and the simulation results show that our
methods in this work give advantageous results at long
distance regime: with the finite key effects being taken,
even the dark counting rate is 10−8, the key rate of this
work can still exceed the absolute limit of repeater-less
key rate[61], and the secure distance is improved 70km
compared with PM-QKD[83]. To achieve better perfor-
mance at all distance points, we proposed AOPPmethod.
Numerical simulation of the asymptotic results shows
that it performs better than NPPTF-QKD[68] at long
distance regime and large noise regime.
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Appendix A: Detail of Z˜0-windows
In the protocol, they use phase-randomized coherent
states. This means, in the case that one and only one
party (say, Alice) decides sending, she may actually sends
a vacuum state. We define such time windows as Z˜0-
windows. The sent out state is identical to the case that
Alice decides not-sending. This looks confusion on bit-
value encoding. However, there is no self-inconsistency
here: If one only looks at the sent-out state, not-sending
is exactly the same with sending a vacuum. Since they use
phase-randomized coherent states, a classical mixture of
Fock states, when she (he) decides sending, she (he) can
then actually sends out a vacuum. But the bit values are
determined by the decisions on sending or not-sending
rather than the state sent out. Consider the cases they
only send out vacuum. We can use a local state |S〉 for
the decision of sending and |N〉 (orthogonal to |S〉) for the
decision of not-sending. To Alice, if she decides sending,
she can then actually send out vacuum |0〉; if she decides
not-sending she also sends out vacuum. If we write out
the state in the whole space, then |S〉|0〉 represents bit
value 1 and |N〉|0〉 represents bit value 0. These two
states are orthogonal.
Key rate formula. In Ref.[64], we simply put all time
windows with vacuum in transmission to tagged bits. But
this is not necessary. The vacuum state in transmission
for a time window when only one party decides sending
is also un-tagged bits. Because in such a case Eve com-
pletely has no idea on which party makes the decision of
sending. We actually can use
R = (n1 + n0)− n1H(e¯ph1 )− fntH(E), (A1)
to calculate the final key length, where n0 is the number
of effective Z˜0-windows. This can improve the perfor-
mance of SNS a little bit than using the original key
length formula Eq.(2). We can also improve Eq.(3) by
Nf = n1 + n0 − n1H(e¯ph1 )− f [N0H(E0) +N1H(E1)],
(A2)
Appendix B: Phase-flip error iteration formula (16)
in odd-parity error rejection
Here we shall derive the phase-flip iteration formula
for those un-tagged bits only. Also, in the SNS protocol,
there is no bit-flip error in the un-tagged bits. For ease
of presentation, we start from the virtual situation that
initially Alice and Bob share n1 entangled pair states
which have no bit-flip error. Obviously, SNS protocol is
permutation invariant, and hence the de Finetti theorem
9[85] applies. Asymptotically,
ρAB =
∫
σ
P (σ)σ⊗n1dσ, (B1)
where n1 is the number of un-tagged bits. Therefore, We
can regard each pair state shared by Alice and Bob as an
i.i.d. state. Consider the condition of zero bit-flip error
for un-tagged bits in SNS protocol, here any pair-state
is two dimensional. For simplicity, we assume that any
local state |0〉 (|1〉) corresponds to bit value 0 (1) for both
Alice and Bob.
σ = cos2 θ|00〉〈00|+ sin2 θ|11〉〈11|
+α exp(−iβ)|11〉〈00|+ α exp(iβ)|00〉〈11|. (B2)
Considering the worst case for key rates, the phase-flip
error rate is
eph(σ) =e¯ph1
=tr(Mˆ+σMˆ
†
+ + Mˆ−σMˆ
†
−)
=
1
2
(cos2 θ + sin2 θ − 2α cosβ)
=
1
2
(1− 2α cosβ),
(B3)
where
Mˆ+ = |+〉A〈+| ⊗ |−〉B〈−|
Mˆ− = |−〉A〈−| ⊗ |+〉B〈+|,
(B4)
and
|+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉)
|−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉).
(B5)
And cosβ ≤ 1 is always satisfied, thus the phase-flip error
rate for ρAB can be expressed as
e¯ph1 ≥
1
2
(1 − 2α), (B6)
where the definition of e¯ph1 is the same as before.
The parity check operations are taken on each sides
of Alice and Bob, for notation clarity, we shall use ⊗ to
divide the subspaces of Alice and Bob. For example, for
a single-pair state in Eq.(B2), we write it in the form:
σ = cos2 θ|0〉〈0| ⊗ |0〉〈0|+ sin2 θ|1〉〈1| ⊗ |1〉〈1|
+α exp(−iβ)|1〉〈0| ⊗ |1〉〈0|+ α exp(iβ)|0〉〈1| ⊗ |0〉〈1|.
(B7)
The density matrix of the two-pair state is σ · σ. The
un-normalized state of the survived pair after odd-
parity error rejection can be represented by the following
formula[86]:
ρ˜odd = (MˆA ⊗ MˆB)(σ · σ)(Mˆ †B ⊗ Mˆ †A) (B8)
where the conditional projection operators
MˆA = |0〉〈01|+ |1〉〈10|
MˆB = |0〉〈01|+ |1〉〈10|.
(B9)
After normalization, we have the following bipartite
single-pair state
ρodd =
1
2 cos2 θ sin2 θ
[cos2 θ sin2 θ|0〉〈0| ⊗ |0〉〈0|
+α2|0〉〈1| ⊗ |0〉〈1|+ α2|1〉〈0| ⊗ |1〉〈0|
+cos2 θ sin2 θ|1〉〈1| ⊗ |1〉〈1|].
(B10)
This is the state for the survived pair if they find the odd
parity values at each side. According to Eq.(B3), the
phase-flip error rate of the survived un-tagged bits after
odd-parity check is
ephodd =
1
2
(1 − α
2
cos2 θ sin2 θ
). (B11)
Since cos2 θ sin2 θ ≤ 1
4
, we have
ephodd ≤
1
2
(1− 4α2). (B12)
Comparing with Eq.(B6), we have
ephodd ≤2e¯ph1 (1− e¯ph1 ). (B13)
Thus the formula of the phase-flip error rate Eqs.(16) is
proved.
Appendix C: Security Proof of AOPP
Here we show the security of the proposed AOPP
method in Sec. III B. Note that, the odd-parity sifting
protocol with key-length Eq.(17) can be related with a
virtual protocol with entangled pairs. Therefore its se-
curity is straightforward. However, in our last protocol,
we use AOPP. This does not correspond to a virtual
protocol of entangled purification since we cannot guar-
antee to always obtain odd-parity results in the bipartite
parity measurements. Therefore we need examine its
security here. Our main idea is this: We can divide
all odd-parity bit pairs from AOPP into two classes,
the number of bit pairs in each class is not larger than
the number of odd-parity pairs from odd-parity sifting
which corresponds to a virtual entanglement purification
protocol. Therefore, each class of bits in AOPP can be
related to virtual entanglement purification protocol and
hence final key from each class alone is secure. Since the
mutual information of these two classes of bits is (al-
most) 0, then they are secure even the final keys of both
classes are used. Here we consider a virtual protocol first.
Prior to the pairing protocol, Bob has a sifted key S
containing Ns bits. He could obtain the information of
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N0 and N1, where the definitions of them are the same
as Eq.(3). He will create two sets of odd-parity bit pairs,
set W1 contains NW1 pairs and set W2 contains NW2
pairs. Also, we define string S¯i: from string S, after
those bits which have been chosen to form pairs in set
Wi are deleted, we obtain string S¯i. Here i can be 1 or
2. Clearly, string S¯1 contains Ns − 2NW1 bits and string
S¯2 contains Ns − 2NW2 bits.
1. Bob estimates the number of odd-parity pairs he would
obtain if he did random pairing, according to Eq.(14)
NR =
N1N0
N1 +N0
. (C1)
According to Eq.(19) in our main body text, if Bob did
AOPP in S, the number of odd-parity pairs he would
obtain is
NA = min(N1, N0). (C2)
We can see that
2NR ≥ NA ≥ NR. (C3)
On this basis, Bob decides two numbers NW1 and NW2 =
NA −NW1 , which satisfied
NW1 ≤ NR,
NW2 ≤ NR.
(C4)
2. Bob decides randomly on either taking operations
stated by 2.1 or operations stated by 2.2 in the follow-
ing:
2.1. 1). Through randomly pairing of bits in S for
some times, Bob obtains ⌊Ns/2⌋ pairs. He chooses NW1
odd-parity pairs and denotes them by set W1. He ig-
nores the other pairs. 2). Through AOPP to bits in set
S¯1 (note that string S¯i was defined earlier in the second
paragraph of this section), he obtains NW2 odd-parity
pairs and denotes them by W2
2.2. 1). Through randomly pairing of bits in S for
some times, Bob obtains ⌊Ns/2⌋ pairs. He chooses NW2
odd-parity pairs and denotes them by set W2, and ig-
nores the other pairs. 2). Through AOPP to bits in set
S¯2, he obtains NW1 odd-parity pairs. He denotes them
by W1
3. After the previous steps, Bob will obtain two odd-
parity pairs sets W1 and W2. With such a setting, to
anybody outside Bob’s lab, each of these two sets could
be obtained from random pairing by Bob. For conve-
nience of description, we label the set obtained by ran-
dom pairing with R, and the set obtained by AOPP with
A.
Fact 1 As long as Bob doesn’t disclose his process, no
one else will ever know where the set of pairs came from,
and even if all the bits in the sifted key are announced, no
one can tell which set was obtained by randomly pairing.
This fact is the basis of the security proof.
Lemma 1 If Wi was obtained by randomly pairing, that
is Wi = R, the final key ri distilled from this set must
be secure. Since Wi was obtained through random pair-
ing, the security of ri can be related to the virtual entan-
glement distillation. Therefore, the mutual information
between ri and S¯i must be negligible. Here i can be 1 or
2.
On the other hand, if set Wi is generated by AOPP,
purely mathematically, we can also distill the final key ri,
and ri itself should be secure, and the mutual information
between ri and S¯i must be negligible. Otherwise Fact 1
will be violated. Then we have
Lemma 2 If Wi was obtained by AOPP, that is Wi =
A, the final key ri distilled from this set must be secure
unconditionally, and the mutual information between ri
and S¯i must be negligible, for Eve has no way to tell which
set is R and which one is A. Here i can be 1 or 2.
We will prove Lemma 2 in detail later. So far we have
three conclusions:
1. key string r1 itself is secure;
2. key string r2 itself is secure;
3. the mutual information between r1 and r2 is negli-
gible. These conclude that the final key r1 ∪ r2 is
secure.
Here the third conclusion can be obtained from Lemma
1 and Lemma 2, since either r1 was distilled by R or
A, the mutual information between r1 and S¯1 must be
negligible, and r2 was originally from S¯1.
Now we start to prove the Lemma 2. For clarity, we
modify the expression of Fact 1. After obtained sifted
key S, pair sets W1 and W2 were secretly generated by
David. Then he hands both sets to Bob and disappears
without providing any information. Bob has got these
two sets and all the sifted keys, but no one except David
knows which set was randomly paired. Then we have
Fact 2 After David disappears, no matter what Bob, Al-
ice or Eve does, there’s no way to know which set was
randomly paired.
We denote the final key distilled from A by rA, and the
final key distilled from R by rR. According to Lemma
1 we know that, Eve can’t attack rR effectively. Now
suppose that Lemma 2 is not tenable, that is to say, Eve
has an effective means to attack rA, which means, Eve
either gets more information directly on rA, or gets more
information after Bob announces S¯A. So Bob and Eve
can work together to figure out which set is A and which
set is R:
1. Bob announces S¯1;
2. Eve uses the information S¯1 to attack r1 and ob-
tains the attack result t;
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3. Bob announces r1;
4. Based on S¯1 and r1, Eve evaluated the attack effect,
that is, the size of the information obtained by her
attack on r1, so as to judge whether W1 is R or A.
Since this conclusion is contrary to Fact 2, Lemma 2 has
been proven. It can be seen from the above discussion
that the secret key extracted from A is secure, then the
secret key extracted from A1 ∪ A2 is also secure. So
Bob can simply form both of his sets W1, W2 by AOPP
only, which is the protocol we proposed in Sec.III B. The
security of the protocol is thus demonstrated.
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